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Abstract. Workflows involve actions and decision making at the level of
each participant. Trusted generation, collection and storage of evidence
is fundamental for these systems to assert accountability in case of dis-
putes. Ensuring the security of audit systems requires reliable protection
of evidence in order to cope with its confidentiality, its integrity at gen-
eration and storage phases, as well as its availability. Collusion with an
audit authority is a threat that can affect all these security aspects, and
there is room for improvement in existent approaches that target this
problem.
This work presents an approach for workflow auditing which targets se-
curity challenges of collusion-related threats, covers different trust and
confidentiality requirements, and offers flexible levels of scrutiny for re-
ported events. It relies on participants verifying each other’s reported
audit data, and introduces a secure mechanism to share encrypted audit
trails with participants while protecting their confidentiality. We discuss
the adequacy of our audit approach to produce reliable evidence despite
possible collusion to destroy, tamper with, or hide evidence.
Keywords: Audit Trails · Confidentiality · Accountability · Collusion.
1 Introduction
A virtual organisation, defined as a collaboration of independent organisations
to fulfill a business requirement [13], requires tasks and decision making to be
spread among the different administrative and security domains of participants.
These collaborations necessitate a way to keep track of transactions between
the involved parties, and evidence of actions needs to be available to assign
accountability in case of a dispute. Evidence should be reliable, and its processing
should not disclose confidential information to any party.
A number of studies shed light on the importance of audit trails in systems
involving multiple participants. Examples of these systems include banking sce-
narios, logistics, supply chain, and e-government [12,24,26,27]. Werner et al. [25]
highlight the importance of reliable audit trails in the financial accounting sector.
Kuntze et al. [11] stress on the importance of data authenticity, integrity and
privacy for evidence stored in forensic databases; they state that maintaining
the confidentiality of parties involved in a chain of evidence is challenging.
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To illustrate the challenge, we present a hypothetical scenario: car insurance
companies rely on data about the driver’s behaviour and habits to calculate
their annual fees. When an individual applies for renewal, the insurance com-
pany sends a request to assess the applicant to the Ministry of Transport. This
ministry requests the car mileage from garages that perform vehicles annual
checkups and any arrest warrant for the applicant from the police department,
and checks the databases of traffic cameras for the neighbourhood in which the
car is most frequently used. Insurance companies do not get all the details about
the driver due to the confidentiality of this data; they receive a report with an
assessment from the Ministry of Transport and use it to determine the insurance
fees. Audit records for every request should be kept: each organisation maintains
a log, and an audit service is used to build audit trails. A privileged insider at
the Ministry of Transport, colluding with an insurance company, modifies the
mileage received from the garages to increase insurance fees. This insider also
modifies the local logs, and colludes with the audit service to modify the audit
records. As seen in this scenario, a collusion with an entity managing a central
audit service renders its data unreliable. Moreover, audit records in workflows
include sensitive information for all participants. In this scenario, audit records
stored at the Ministry of Transport or with a central audit system expose per-
sonal and confidential data.
For a workflow audit architecture to be trusted, one participant should not
have the option of colluding with the authority that manages the audit system
to breach the confidentiality of, tamper with, or destroy evidence [29]. A central
approach in which a single system is trusted to collect, verify, and store logs is a
single point of failure in this case. In practice, workflow engines, commonly used
to coordinate interactions between workflow participants and to provide audit-
ing services, are a representation of a central approach for audit [12, 17]. Some
approaches, [26] for example, propose holding each participating administration
accountable to store its own audit logs. Although this practice protects the confi-
dentiality of participants, it does not provide protection against tampering with
and destroying evidence.
We, therefore, follow a trustless approach to produce reliable evidence. We
define trustless audit by not giving an organisation the ability to generate ev-
idence without a verification of its authenticity. Our architecture retrieves and
verifies audit records in a distributed way immediately after generation by par-
ticipants, while protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of this
data from malicious entities working individually or colluding with each other.
Following our approach, malicious behaviour of tampering with, deleting, or false
reporting of audit records is detected by honest participants. Our contribution
is an architecture that offers mitigation from collusion-related threats to tamper
with or destroy multi-party workflow audit data. This depends on the collab-
oration of participants to verify and obtain a copy of encrypted audit records
reported to an audit server, as well as to ensure the authenticity of this server.
We use Shamir secret sharing mechanism [18] to minimise the risk of confidential
data exposure.
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In a multi-party workflow, our architecture:
• Offers a means to verify reported audit records.
• Supports distributed storage of audit data at any degree of details.
• Introduces a data structure for audit trails covering arbitrary topology.
• Offers audit capability to any K out of N participants.
This rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related work.
Section 3 presents the problem statement and the threat model. A detailed
explanation of our approach is presented in Section 4, and an analysis of its
adequacy to fulfil our goals in section 5. Implementation and evaluation are
covered in sections 6, and we conclude the paper in section 7.
2 Related Work
Many audit frameworks proposed in the literature log events as evidence to verify
abiding to security policies and regulatory requirements. Rudolph et al. [17]
designed an audit trail with a summary of participation exchanged between
participants to show fulfilment of tasks and enforce behavioural policies during
workflow execution; they extended their work in [22] to cover the anonymity of
participating entities, but did not discuss the security of audit trails at storage
and their protection from destruction. Hale et al. [10] present a design and
verification framework for services interactions across different clouds to verify
abiding to information sharing policies. Other solutions [5–8, 12, 19, 27] cover a
variety of audit data including signatures, users’ consents for access control, data
provenance, service level agreements related logs, and records of database access.
However, a trusted central system is used to process logs in [19] and to store audit
records in the other frameworks. This raises trust and confidentiality problems
since collusion with the central point in any of these cases makes tampering with
or destroying evidence possible, as well as breaching the secrecy of audit data.
To protect the confidentiality of audit data, especially when relying on a third
party service as proposed in [15] and [16], a common practice is to encrypt audit
data prior to its submission to the outsourced storage. [1, 2, 23] are proposals
that require a trusted party to protect encryption keys for audits, and Wouters
et al. [26] rely on the user to protect the key in their approach. Entities with
encryption keys can breach the confidentiality and in some cases the integrity of
audit data; also, refusing to share these keys when an audit is required leads to
withholding evidence. The framework proposed by Ray et al. [16] uses a secret
sharing scheme to split encryption keys to multiple logging hosts; however, their
approach covers logging for single applications, and does not consider multi-party
interactions.
For forensic investigations, a high degree of assurance for the integrity of
digital evidence is required at the collection, generation, and storage phases [29].
A variety of hash based approaches, relying on hash chains and hash trees,
are proposed in [4, 21, 28, 29] to assure the integrity of audit records collected
by a cloud service provider. Zawoard et al. [28] mitigate possible tampering
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with evidence that can result from collusion between users, investigators, and
cloud service providers. They encrypt the log files with a public key belonging
to a law enforcement agency to protect users’ privacy, and adopt a hash-chain
scheme referred to as ’Proof of Past Log (PPL)’, covering the entire log history
for every user on a daily basis. However, these approaches trust the logging
entity, being the cloud provider, to report correct audit data and to assure its
availability. A proposal by Ahsan et al. [3] is an extension that covers some
of the limitations of [28]. In their work, log records generated by cloud service
providers are not trusted, and users are required, within a specific timing, to
verify their logged activity with their cloud provider and to file a complaint in
case of any activity that needs to be denied. Logs attributed to a user are then
stored on the cloud service provider servers and encrypted with this user’s private
key. To mitigate withholding evidence by users, a secret sharing mechanism is
proposed to distribute shares of every user’s keys to different cloud providers that
are assumed not to collude. This approach covers auditing users’ activities in a
single cloud only, and does not consider multi-party workflows; it also assumes
continuous human cooperation for its verification phase, and does not consider
destruction of evidence by a cloud provider.
Blockchain is another approach that uses hash chains and the consensus of a
large network of nodes to protect data at storage [24]. Some approaches, [20,24]
for example, use blockchains to produce audit trails for processes involving mul-
tiple parties; however, this technology does not scale to store large transactions,
and therefore only hashes of these transactions are stored on the blockchain [20].
While similar approaches verify the integrity of audit records, they do not protect
against destruction of evidence.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach improves the availability, con-
fidentiality, and integrity of audit records in distributed systems. We combine
practices in the literature for collective building of audit trails with forensic ap-
proaches to protect digital evidence, and introduce verification mechanisms in
our architecture to assert accountability of participants in multi-party workflows.
3 Problem Statement and Threat Model
This work argues the need for improvement in audit approaches used for work-
flows covering multiple administrative domains. Every participant should be
accountable for a contribution reflecting an action or a decision in a workflow.
Existent audit approaches, discussed in the previous section, depend on trusted
parties to record or store audit records; this renders the integrity and availability
of these records questionable. Also, trusting a single entity with encryption keys
leaves room for withholding evidence. When following approaches discussed in
the literature, the problems below can be faced:
• Destroying or withholding evidence
• Tampering with audit data at storage
• Reporting incorrect audit data
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3.1 Threat Model
This model excludes compromised elements being under the control of an at-
tacker. Actions are considered to reflect the intentions of the administration
managing an element, rather than a fault in the system. Certificate authorities
and key issuers are honest; they distribute correct cryptographic keys and do
not expose participants’ secrets.
The adversary vector includes participants that aim to rig an audit reporting
process to avoid non-repudiation. Adversary’s goal can be achieved by destroy-
ing or tampering with audit records, or by using incorrect cryptographic keys
for encryption or signatures to jeopardise the records’ usability. The entity man-
aging the audit server can also be malicious, and may attempt to tamper with,
destroy, or hide audit records from some participants. A number of malicious
entities (including workflow participants and the audit server) can collude to fal-
sify the audit process; this includes skipping the verification of reported audits,
hiding audit data from honest participants, cooperating to distribute different
versions of records, and delaying the workflow with false alerts. Breaking the
confidentiality of workflow transactions using audit records is another malicious
goal for an adversary.
Under this model, we aim to verify the authenticity of reported audit records
as they are generated as well as their integrity during storage or distribution,
and to protect their confidentiality at every stage of the audit process. We also
achieve the availability of evidence when a definable number of participants are
honest. We consider audit data reported by colluding entities to be unreliable,
but prove any malicious behaviour resulting from collusion by using reliable
audit records reported by honest participants.
4 Proposed Approach
We propose a confidentiality friendly and decentralised approach for workflow
audit. Encrypted audit trails, covering arbitrary workflows, are checked for au-
thenticity as they are built, and are distributed to participants to protect from
tampering with or destroying evidence. To safeguard the confidentiality of this
data, a threshold of key shares is required to reconstruct the decryption key. This
also minimises the chance of witholding evidence by an entity that is holding
the key. Audit trails can be constructed with any degree of details ranging from
a summary of interactions to full transactions.
4.1 Notation
We use a graph to represent workflows, in which nodes(vertices) represent an
organisation in the workflow, and edges with weights represent the order of their
interactions. In this regard, edge (A,B) in Figure 1 is the first interaction in
the workflow manifested by a message sent from organisation A to B. Workflows
covered in this work are pre-established, meaning that the participating entities
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Figure 1. Our representation of workflows.
and their order of interaction are known by participants at the beginning of the
workflow execution and do not change until it finishes. For ease of representation,
we introduce the notation below used to describe cryptography operations:
• An encrypted message sent from A to B, containing PayloadA→B and the
signature of the sender over the payload, is represented by
PayloadA→B(SignA, EncB) = EncB [(PayloadA→B)+SignA(PayloadA→B)].
• An additional signature over the encrypted message, Sign′sender, can be sent
alongside the cipher text. The message in this case is represented by:
PayloadA→B(SignA, EncB , Sign′A) =
PayloadA→B(SignA, EncB) + SignA[PayloadA→B(SignA, EncB)]
• Hash is a one-way hash function with a strong collision resistance.
• Shares of a workflow private key wfl Pri, split with Shamir secret sharing to
N shares, are referred to as K1...KN . The equivalent public key is wfl Pub.
• String X concatenation with Y is represented by: X||Y .
When presenting this architecture, the terms node and participant are used
interchangeably to indicate a participants in a workflow.
4.2 System Overview
Our architecture uses a special node, referred to as the ’Audit Server’. This audit
server can be hosted by any node or managed by a separate entity as a central or
distributed system, but is not trusted by participants. It is only used to display
audit records to participants during the workflow, and not to permanently store
any data. For every action, an audit record is published on the audit server
by a participant, and verified by another. Every participant in the workflow is
given credentials to publish encrypted data on this server. Participants check the
authenticity of the information on the server, and update their local storage of
audit data continuously. Every participant has a certificate, and every workflow
has a key pair which public part is known by all participants, but the private
part is shared between them following Shamir secret sharing mechanism [18].
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Figure 2. Overview of the proposed architecture.
As shown in Figure 2, the proposed approach includes two types of security
verifications.
• The Audit Record Verification requires every node that receives a message
to check it against its equivalent audit record published on the audit server.
• The Audit Server Verification requires every node to check for any inconsis-
tency suggesting malicious behaviour from the audit server.
Before going through the details of these verification mechanisms, we present
our key management scheme, and the data structure we use for our audit trails.
4.3 Key Management
We assume that certificates for every participant are managed with public key
infrastructure (PKI). While certificates can be used in multiple workflows, work-
flow keys are only used in a single workflow topology.
Workflow key management is handled by an entity that generates a key pair
(wfl Pub, wfl Pri), splits (wfl Pri) following Shamir secret sharing mechanism
[18], and securely distributes (wfl Pub,Ki) to participants; a threshold K of
shares (Ki) can reconstruct wfl Pri. Workflow key distribution can either be
done through direct messages to each participant over a secure channel, or by
encrypting each share of the key with the corresponding participant’s private
key and posting them to the audit server.
This critical role should be given to the participant that has the least incen-
tive to be dishonest with the key distribution and to expose wfl Pri. This is
generally the first or last participant depending on the workflow: a first partici-
pant in one workflow can be a travel agency required to keep track of bookings
for its customers, and the last participant in another workflow can be a car
manufacturing industry that needs to keep track of where parts of customised
vehicles, ordered by customers, are from. Alternatively, this role can be assigned
to a dedicated key manager.
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4.4 Audit Data Structure
This work covers logging for every interaction between participants in a workflow.
A message, sent from a participant to another, contains a payload which includes
the data for the intended recipient. Cryptographic operations are performed to
assure the authenticity and confidentiality of the transaction. For simplicity, we
assume the linear topology shown in Figure 2. A message sent from C to D in
the workflow would be of the form
MsgC→D = PayloadC→D(SignC , EncD)
In turn, audit data published by C on the audit server should have the exact
same payload, but is encrypted with the workflow public key, and signed after
encryption:
AuditC→D = PayloadC→D(SignC , Encwfl−Pub, Sign′C).
The second signature verifies that the audit server has not tampered with the
audit record. Each payload includes data to the receiver and audit records of the
previous transactions of the workflow when applicable. In this case
PayloadC→D = DataC→D +AuditB→C .
Recursively, a decryption of an audit record with wfl Pri, recovered from a
threshold K out of N parts (Ki) of wfl Pri, leads to another encrypted one
which in its turn gets decrypted with the same key.
4.5 Audit Record Verification
Throughout the workflow, participants are required to verify the correctness of
the audit records equivalent to the messages that they receive.
As shown in Figure 3, an audit record is published by every participant
after sending a message as well as the last participant after receiving the final
message. We only show the content of the Payload in the exchanged messages
for the clarity of the figure.
A recipient decrypts the Msg with its private key, and verifies the sender’s
signature. It then performs Audit Record Verification: the recipient updates its
storage of audit records from the audit server, then checks if the audit records of
previous transactions in the message are identical to what is shown on the audit
server. It also verifies that the sender of the message did not omit any audit
records that should be included, and that these audit records are for the right
previous transactions; this is feasible since every participant knows the topology
of the pre-established workflow, and can therefore verify the signatures on the
audit records. The recipient then re-encrypts the payload and sender’s signature
with wfl Pub, and checks if the cipher version of it is on the audit server.
Back to Figure 3, after a successful Audit Record Verification the recipient
of a message keeps the payload with the sender’s signature as a receipt. The
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Figure 3. Sequence diagram for our approach on a workflow that starts and ends with
participant A. Upwards arrows represent reporting to the Audit Server.
recipient then sends this receipt back after adding its signature to the sender;
this is a proof of delivery. In case any of these steps goes wrong, protocol is to
raise concern for malicious behaviour.
Another test to verify the authenticity of the audit server is Audit Server
Verification. Details about this mechanism is covered in the next section.
4.6 Audit Server Verification
Audit Server Verification algorithm is executed by every participant right after
sending or receiving a message, and at a recurrent basis during the workflow.
The frequency of execution is configured depending on the average execution
time of a workflow. The aim is to ensure that the audit server is displaying the
same authentic workflow audit records to every participant, and to distribute
these records to participants. Tailoring responses to participants is possible if
the Audit Server is malicious. We present the following mechanisms to target
this challenge:
Digest on the fly: when publishing audit records, each participant is re-
quired to add a digest of its local audit records storage, including the one that
is being published, signed with its private key. Back to Figure 2, AuditB→C in
this case would be published alongside
Hash(AuditA→B ||AuditB→C) + SignC [Hash(AuditA→B ||AuditB→C)].
Referring to Algorithm 1, participants verify that the audit records that they
published on and pulled from the audit server are still displayed; they then
update their storage of audit records. After that, they compare the hash value
of their stored audit records with the signed digest reported by the last publisher.
Different digest values suggest that the audit server is showing different records
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to participants. Detecting a malicious activity from the audit server requires an
honest participant to publish an audit record after this activity was committed.
Algorithm 1 Audit Server Verification Algorithm.
Requirement: Verify the authenticity of the Audit Server
Update local storage of audit records for participants
Input: Reported Recs[] . Audit records reported by a participant
Stored Recs[] . Audit records stored Locally with a participant
Output: Boolean indicating if Audit Server is honest
1: Server Recs[]← Pull Recs() . Pull audit records from the server
2: if Reported Recs !=Ø then
3: for each R∈ Reported Recs[] do
4: if R does not exist in Server Recs[] then
5: return False
6: if Stored Recs !=Ø then
7: for each R∈ Reported Recs[] do
8: if R does not exist in Server Recs[] then
9: Return False
10: Local Recs[] ←Server Recs[] . Updating Stored Records
11: H← Hash(Local Recs[]) . Comparing Digests
12: if H==Last Published Digest then
13: Return True
14: else
15: Return False
Verify at the End: alternatively, the same steps of the Algorithm are fol-
lowed, except that the hash comparison is only done at the end of the workflow.
The final node publishes a signed digest of the records it has, and other par-
ticipants follow and do the same. Not having identical digest values suggests a
malicious behaviour from the audit server.
Combo: This combines both of the previous two approaches.
4.7 Protocol
This section lists the actions required to reach our security goals:
• Participants keep their receipts, and are required to alert others if a signed
receipt of delivery is not received after sending a message.
• Audit Record Verification is always performed by recipients on message de-
livery. Failure of verification alerts all participants.
• Audit Server Verification is performed by a sender after publishing a record,
a receiver when getting a message, and by every participant on a recurrent
basis during the workflow. Failure of verification alerts all participants.
Following this protocol is essential to reveal any malicious activity by entities
working on their own or colluding. We discuss potential attack scenarios in the
next section.
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5 Analysis
In this section, we discuss attack scenarios caused by a malicious node or a
malicious audit server working individually, collusion among participants, and
collusion between the malicious participants and the audit server. We analyse
how each scenario is handled following our approach.
5.1 Malicious Participant
Working individually, a malicious participant can attempt to truncate audit
trails: such participant attempts to publish incorrect audit data for the message
it sent, or to send incorrect audit records of previous transactions in a message.
This is caught by the Audit Record Verification performed by the honest recipient
of the message.
5.2 Malicious Audit Server
A malicious audit server may attempt to hide audit records from all or some
participants, or to tamper with these records.
Hiding Audit Records: a malicious audit server can attempt to hide audit
records from some participants to limit the distribution of audit data and fa-
cilitate destruction of evidence. This is detected by digest verification of any
adopted mechanism.
Tampering with Audit Records: this is detected as soon as an honest node
reports and audit record with Digest on the Fly or Combo mechanisms, or
at the end of the workflow when Digest at the End is followed.
5.3 Collusion Between Nodes
What colluding participants can achieve and the impact of their collusion vary
according to their positioning in a workflow. We discuss possible malicious be-
haviour of consecutive and non-consecutive colluders.
Non-Consecutive Colluders: one malicious node in Figure 4.1 can report an
audit record for the other to use as part of their message. This is detected by
the honest participant performing Audit Record Verification.
Figure 4. Collusion between participants with coloured background.
Consecutive Colluders: one node can cover for the other by skipping the
Audit Record Verification phase. This leads to one of the cases below:
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• Truncating the audit trail if C in Figure 4.2 publishes a corrupted audit
record, or a record not including previous audit data
• Having audit trail with a false record, if C reports different data for audit
than what it sent to D.
Audit records posted or verified by nodes not following protocol are unreliable.
Audit data published by B is reliable, since B has a receipt of delivery signed by
C to prove its honesty. Honest node E also has a receipt, and it makes sure D
publishes the equivalent audit record of the message it sent on the audit server.
If there are more than two consecutive colluding nodes, the nodes that have
followed the protocol and that surround the colluding participants will have
credible audit data.
5.4 Collusion Between Participants and the Audit Server
In this section, we illustrate cases of collusion between participants and the audit
server and discuss the adequacy of each verification mechanism. In Figure 5.1,
malicious node C can sign two different versions of an audit record; it relies on
the audit server to display the correct record for only D and E, since they require
it for the Audit Record Verification, and to display the faulty one to A and B.
This is detected with any Audit Server Verification mechanism that is used:
1. If we publish signed digests with audit records (Digest On the Fly), this
malicious activity is caught when node D, the first honest node following the
malicious activity, publishes its audit data.
Figure 5. Malicious audit server colluding with participants.
2. With Verify at the End, the malicious behaviour gets detected when com-
paring hash values at the end. When comparing audit records, two versions
of a record incriminate both the audit server and the publishing node.
3. The combination of methods (Combo) also detects this malicious behaviour.
In 5.2, Digest on the Fly does not detect the collusion with the Audit Server
since there is not an honest node that follows the malicious one. However, it does
not lead to any data loss since all transactions have been covered in the record
before it.
The combination of methods (Combo) combines the advantages of the two
verification mechanisms; Figure 5.3 is a scenario where Combo method is a
good option:
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• Attempts from C and the audit server to show A and B different versions of
AuditC→D than the one sent to D is detected on the fly.
• E and F cannot collude with the audit server to show honest participants
different audit data.
6 Preliminary Evaluation
Figure 6. Average processing time for different log-normally distributed delays.
The implementation of the proposal is available on our Github repository1. In
this section, we simulate a number of workflows relying on the same audit server.
For this evaluation, we use a linear topology of nodes following our protocol, and
consider the traffic of requests to the Audit Server to be log-normally distributed
[9,14]. To simulate server load, we introduce a log-normally distributed delay of
the form eµ+σZ to the Audit Server’s response time. The figure below shows the
average processing time for each case. While the audit server processing power
is inversely proportional to µ, σ reflects the multitude of workflows running
simultaneously.
Following this evaluation method, changing the number of nodes and the
size of the exchanged Payload resulted in graphs with different scales for the
Average Iteration Time, but with similar slopes for the lines. Comparing the
slope of curves in Figure 6, servers with high computational power show stability
and reliability at scale. Less powerful servers can still be used for systems that
can afford latency at busy times.
1 https://github.com/antonionehme/audit-repository-simulations/tree/
master/AuditProject/AuditProject
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we presented an approach to enhance the availability, integrity and
confidentiality of audit trails of workflows throughout the collection and storage
of evidence. Collusion to hide or tamper with audit data is detectable, and the
chance of withholding evidence is reduced due to the audit capability of K out
of N participants.
This is part of a larger project to develop solutions for digital government
workflows in which reliable audit is a key requirement. Decision making involv-
ing multiple government departments requires a collusion-proof audit system
to assure the accountability while protecting the confidentiality of participants.
This approach meets these requirements by providing a high level of assurance
on the availability, integrity and confidentiality of digital evidence. We proposed
this approach as part of a government digital transformation strategy, and we
are working on integrating government-tailored scenarios and on evaluating our
audit architecture for this purpose.
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